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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper documents the “finance-growth-crisis nexus” in India, Indonesia and Mexico while 
controlling for those factors of financial openness (capital account liberalization), trade openness 
(trade liberalization) and financial structure (stock market development relative to banking 
sector) as additional variables. Our sample countries are large emerging economies of different 
regions with high economic growth, various extents of financial deepening and major crisis 
episodes. The finance-growth-crisis nexus in each of the three countries is examined through the 
system-based analysis of cointegration in line with Johansen (1988). We also take the element of 
structural break into estimation by performing the Lagrange multiplier endogenous break test of 
Lee and Strazicich (2003; 2004). The key findings are: (1) the causal direction of the finance-
growth nexus is a country-specific matter; (2) the increasing level of financial deepening 
significantly causes financial crisis; and (3) the effects of financial openness, trade openness and 
financial structure on output/finance/crisis are not clear-cut. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
s first presented by Schumpeter (1911) in the early twentieth century and advanced by McKinnon 
(1973) and Shaw (1973) decades ago, it has been generally agreed that financial development leads 
to higher economic growth. More precisely, financial intermediaries play the key role in channeling 
funds to those entities with productive investment opportunities in an economy. This finance-leading view is further 
elaborated by the endogenous growth literature (see Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Bencivenga and Smith, 1991). 
Following the so-called “McKinnon-Shaw” hypothesis, several developing countries have initiated reforming their 
economic and financial systems to improve the efficiency of financial intermediaries with the objective of financial 
deepening and high economic growth. In contrast, economists like Robinson (1952) and Lucas (1988) contend that 
the role of finance in economic development is overemphasized; it is output growth that creates the demand for 
financial services and thus the financial system automatically responds to that demand. For settling this debate, a 
number of studies have been conducted though, empirical evidence has not been reconciled yet reporting mixed 
results, that is, either finance→output or output→finance or finance↔output (bilateral). 
 
Three basic problems are observed in the literature. First, there are few empirical studies that address the 
long-run trivariate linkage between finance, output and crisis, specifically in the context of cointegration and 
Granger causality. Before the event, crisis-hit economies were typically liberalizing their financial markets while 
experiencing financial boom together with high GDP growth. Nonetheless, economic theory does not explicitly 
provide a clear hypothesis explaining the effects of finance and output on crisis or the effects of crisis on 
finance/output. These facts prompt us to extend the “finance-growth” nexus to the “finance-growth-crisis” nexus. 
Second, in the same token as financial crisis, the changing contexts of openness and financial structure in an 
economy have not been mattered yet in assessing the finance-growth nexus. In this paper, we highlight financial 
openness (capital account liberalization), trade openness (trade liberalization) and financial structure (stock market 
development relative to banking sector); nowadays, these three have been widely accepted as the effective tools for 
A 
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accelerating economic growth as well as for transforming/globalizing a developing economy. Indeed, remarkable 
developments in external finance, international trade and stock market development have been witnessed in our 
sample countries and other emerging economies over the last few decades. Meanwhile, as these developments 
rapidly proceeded, each economy was increasingly exposed to financial fragility and was ultimately hit by severe 
financial crisis. Therefore, it is rationally questioned whether/how financial openness, trade openness and financial 
structure exert some impacts on the linkage between finance, output and crisis. Third, in the empirical literature of 
the finance-growth nexus, the school of the cross-country and panel data analysis has been dominant. Accordingly, 
the leading evidence ― financial deepening holds a positive impact on economic growth ― is drawn from those 
models. However, several methodological drawbacks of the cross-country and panel data analysis have been pointed 
out, for instance, the assumption of a homogeneous growth path across different countries irrespective of countries’ 
sizes and levels of development (Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Luintel et al., 2008). In assessing the finance-
growth-crisis causality in our sample of India, Indonesia and Mexico, all of which are large developing economies 
but belong to different regions and income groups, the cross-country and panel data approach would not provide 
plausible estimates. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the cointegration and Granger causality between financial 
development, economic growth and financial crisis in India, Indonesia and Mexico while controlling for the 
elements of financial openness, trade openness, financial structure and structural break in assessment. All the three 
countries are known as large emerging economies of various paces and degrees of financial deepening, openness and 
financial structure, and severe crisis episodes (i.e., India’s 1991 crisis, the Asian 1997 crisis and Mexico’s 1994-
1995 crisis)
1
. This paper contributes to the literature by three aspects. First, a country-by-country investigation is 
conducted for the finance-growth-crisis nexus in the three economies, so that policy implications are drawn by 
carefully analyzing each country’s estimation. Thus, the evidence from our study ― which takes into account 
country-specific conditions enough ― will be more plausible than that from a cross-country and panel data study ― 
which seek a single generalized result by averaging and pooling sample countries’ data sets. Second, we address the 
“finance-growth-crisis” nexus rather than the “finance-growth” nexus. By doing so, more accurate statistics on the 
finance-growth nexus are expected, since the interaction between finance, output and crisis must crucially determine 
the effect of finance/output on each of them. More precisely, we look at how financial crisis ― as one of the 
endogenous variables in the cointegrating vector ― exhibits a background effect on the finance-growth nexus. It is 
also concerned how both finance and output influence crisis (finance→crisis and output→crisis) having either 
positive or negative impact. Third, this three-way causality is examined by including financial openness, trade 
openness and financial structure as additional variables. This is novel to the literature because, to our best 
knowledge, there are no studies that consider all these three in a single assessment, especially in investigating the 
finance-growth nexus. The global circumstances surrounding our sample of emerging economies are increasingly 
complicated over the last few decades. By exposing the finance-growth-crisis nexus to each of the three variables, 
more information and robustness are attached to our analysis as well as biased and inconsistent results ― due to 
omitted variables and model misspecification ― can be avoided. The remainder of the present paper is organized as 
follows. The relevant literature is reviewed in Section 2. The underlying variables in this study are described in 
Section 3. Methodology is outlined in Section 4, our findings are reported and discussed in Section 5, and 
conclusion and policy implications are given in Section 6. We used the data from the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) and the World Bank’s Financial Structure Dataset (FSD) and World Development Indicators (WDI). 
 
2.   LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
While theory connects financial deepening to higher economic performance, the empirical verification of 
the finance-growth nexus has not been reconciled yet. This issue is addressed through the following regressions: 
 
                                                                    (1) 
 
                                                                    (2) 
 
                                                 
1 For India’s 1991 crisis, see Joshi and Little (1996) and Nayyar (1996); for the Asian 1997 crisis, see the World Bank (1998) and 
Lane et al. (1999); and for Mexico’s 1994-95 crisis, see Calvo and Mendoza (1996) and Tornell et al. (2003). 
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where Yi is the economic growth of country i, FDi is an indicator of financial development, Xi is a set of controlled 
variables, and e1 and e2 are the error terms. In the multi-country assessment of the finance-growth nexus, there has 
been a methodological controversy between two schools. On the one hand, the school of cross-country and panel 
data analysis was pioneered by King and Levine (1993)
2
. These studies advocate a positive link of finance→output 
while seeking a single generalized result by pooling and averaging the data of several sample countries and by 
calculating Equation 1 only in which economic growth is the dependent variable. On the other hand, the school of 
time series analysis was pioneered by Demetriades and Hussein (1996). Estimating both Equations 1 and 2, the time 
series approach examines the Granger causality between finance and output and thus allows us to perform a country-
by-country investigation. Nonetheless, the time series evidence of the finance-growth nexus in each country, 
particularly for causal direction, has been mixed, that is, either finance→output or output→finance or 
finance↔output (bilateral)3.  
 
As far as financial crisis is concerned, the adverse implication of financial deepening ― as a result of 
opening up an economy in a hasty manner ― has been highlighted, as the increasing extent of financial fragility and 
severe crisis episodes have been witnessed in emerging economies. In fact, there are two different strands of the 
literature on the impact of financial development on economic growth (Loayza and Rancière, 2006). As 
aforementioned, the finance-growth nexus literature emphasizes a positive effect of financial depth as measured by, 
for instance, private domestic credit and liquid liabilities. In contrast, the financial crisis literature finds that those 
measures of financial deepening are among the best predictors of both banking and currency crises and resultant 
economic downturns (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). As government 
regulation and control on financial intermediaries are lifted up, the integration of financial markets across emerging 
and industrialized economies has been observed. Under such a global environment, the growth effects of 
liberalization (both external finance and international trade) were emphasized in emerging economies over the last 
two decades. Likewise, some countries also promoted stock market development as well as allowed foreign financial 
intermediaries for entering their financial (both credit and stock) markets. Accordingly, while emerging economies 
became more open to both finance and trade together with expanding stock markets, a dramatic change observed 
during that period was the surge in the volume of financial flows from the industrialized world to emerging 
economies. Meanwhile, the problem of asymmetric information ― that typically leads to adverse selection and 
moral hazard ― became prominent in growing but immature and less regulated financial markets that were 
increasingly exposed to speculation (Mishkin, 1999). Ultimately, the financial boom in an emerging economy was 
terminated by the sudden occurrence of financial crisis (e.g., India’s 1991 crisis, the Asian 1997 crisis and Mexico’s 
1994-1995 crisis) whose costs and damages were economically and socially huge. 
 
As proposed in Introduction, all of financial openness (capital account liberalization), trade openness (trade 
liberalization) and financial structure (stock market development relative to banking sector) are considered as the 
key factors behind the finance-growth nexus and financial crisis in emerging economies that have been in the 
process of liberalization and globalization. For each topic, the literature is extensive together with a number of 
empirical studies that assess their effects on finance and economic growth
4
. First of all, the main idea of financial 
openness and trade openness is summarized as such that, outward-oriented economies ― opening up their financial 
markets to capital flow and promoting international trade ― consistently have higher growth rates than those of 
inward-oriented economies. One influential hypothesis is that trade opening, when combined with openness to 
capital flow, encourages financial development by increasing the demand for external finance and accelerates 
economic growth (Rajan and Zingales, 2003)
5
. While openness to capital and trade flows stimulates output growth, 
it has been pointed out that such openness also increases financial fragility and so the risk of financial crisis, 
augmenting the volatility in an economy. Thus, the macroeconomic volatility literature initially mattered the link 
between economic growth and volatility (Ramey and Ramey, 1995) and recently extended to investigating that 
                                                 
2 Recently, the generalized method of moments (GMM) panel data analysis has been common. 
3 For our sample of countries, see Demetriades and Hussein (1996), Luintel and Khan (1999), Kassimatis and Spyrou (2001), 
Fase and Abma (2003) and Rousseau and Vuthipadadorn (2005). 
4 For financial openness and trade openness, some studies focus on either of them (e.g., Ito, 2006 and Yanikkaya, 2003), whereas 
the others are concerned with both of them (e.g., Baltagi et al., 2009). 
5 Deferring from Rajan and Zingales (2003), McKinnon (1993) emphasizes the sequencing of liberalization in which trade 
openness should come first before financial openness otherwise the economy is exposed to severe financial instability. 
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linkage in terms of globalization, that is, growing financial integration and international trade (Kose et al., 2006; 
Ahmed and Suardi, 2009). On the other hand, the issue of financial structure is relevant to the debate on the relative 
growth effects of bank-based versus (stock) market-based financial systems (Beck and Levine, 2002; Luintel et al., 
2008). We observe that, since stock market provides more liquidities (together with the higher extent of speculation) 
than bank credit does, the increasing impact of stock market development relative to banking ― the latter is more 
controlled and regulated by monetary authorities than the former is ― can be regarded as another form of 
liberalizing a financial system and so opening up an economy. And it has been relatively uninformed about a 
potential linkage between financial fragility/crisis and financial structure due to few empirical studies on this topic 
in the literature. However, it looks quite interesting to explore this issue. 
 
3.   DATA 
 
We disaggregated all the three countries’ annual nominal and real per capita GDP (nominal GDP deflated 
by the GDP deflator and the population) series into quarterly ones through the method suggested by Chow and Lin 
(1971)
6
. Nominal GDP series are used as a deflator for making the summary indicators, whereas real per capita GDP 
― in the form of logarithm ― is employed as the economic growth indicator (EG) which is one of the endogenous 
variables in the analysis (see Appendixes 1, 2 and 5). Subsequently, we briefly explain the five summary indicators 
of the financial development indicator (FD), financial crisis indicator (FC), financial openness indictor (FOP), trade 
openness indicator (TOP) and financial structure indicator (FST). In constructing the summary indicators, we use the 
principal component approach as suggested by Demetriades and Luintel (1997) and Beck and Levine (2002). The 
plots of the three countries’ EGs and summary indicators are given in Appendixes 7 to 9. 
 
3.1   Financial Development Indicator 
 
We observe that there is no single indicator that sufficiently covers all aspects of financial deepening in the 
literature. Many studies ― including King and Levine (1993), Demetriades and Hussein (1996) and recent ones ― 
separately examine the relationship between output (mostly real per capita GDP) and each of financial development 
variables, such as liquidity liabilities (M3) and total domestic credit as measured by their ratios to GDP. 
Furthermore, banking and stock market ― two major constituents of financial development ― have been 
independently treated in the literature
7
. Hence, there are few studies that regard financial deepening as an integrated 
phenomenon of banking and stock market development, despite the growing impact of the latter in emerging 
economies. Considering these issues, we suggest that financial development ― as a single phenomenon ― should 
be measured by assembling several elements. And the five elementary variables of financial development, which are 
commonly used in the literature,
 
are integrated to make the financial development indicator (FD) (see Appendix 1)
8
. 
The ratio of money supply to GDP (MTG) is the simplest proxy for financial deepening. As proposed by Beck et al. 
(1999), we are concerned with the financial size- and activity (liquidity) measures (BATG, PCTG, SKTG and 
SVTG), through which the impacts of two financial channels (banking and stock market) and their two aspects (size 
and activity) are captured
9
. 
 
3.2    Financial Crisis Indicator 
 
In creating the financial crisis indicator (FC), we suggest the following two points. First, financial crisis 
should be measured by a rich set of macroeconomic indicators. The rationale is that although financial crises are 
generally classified into currency- and banking crises, we consider financial crisis as a combined macroeconomic 
                                                 
6 Although our analysis bases on quarterly time series data, India and Indonesia do not offer quarterly GDP series that entirely 
cover the sample period 1981Q1 to 2007Q4. Besides, while Mexico does provide quarterly GDP series covering the sample 
period, those series seem to be disaggregated by the Mexican authority in its own manner. For keeping uniformity in the analysis, 
we disaggregate all the three countries’ annual GDP series in the same manner, i.e., through the Chow and Lin method. 
7 For example, Levine and Zervos (1998) and Arestis et al. (2001) investigated the linkage between economic growth and stock 
market development. 
8 In this paper, a summary indicator is made of several elementary variables. 
9 In making FD and financial structure indicator (FST), we use claims on private sector of IFS line 32D rather than those of IFS 
line 22D assuming that monetary authorities engage in commercial banking activities to some extent in developing countries like 
our sample countries. 
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phenomenon consisting of both currency and banking crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). In fact, each type of 
crisis is approximated by several macroeconomic factors
10
. Second, obtaining a hint from the ongoing debate in the 
macroeconomic volatility literature, we argue that, while financial fragility ― as a continuous phenomenon ― is 
measured as changing volatility in an economy, financial crisis can be identified as an extreme volatility in that 
process
11.
 Based on these arguments, we calculate the volatility in each of 16 elementary variables of financial crisis 
(see Appendix 2) by the squared returns
12
. In case of real exchange rate (ER), for example, its volatility is calculated 
as follows: 
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Subsequently, we compute a four-quarter rolling average of Xt
2
, as the volatility values in level are too uneven to 
expose more correlations among financial crisis variables in producing FC. And since the availability of financial 
crisis variables and the results of the principal component analysis differ for each of the three countries, we have 
produced the FCs that consist of different numbers and combinations of financial crisis variables (see Appendix 3). 
 
3.3 Other Summary Indicators 
Referring to the arguments given by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) who construct the indices of external 
assets and liabilities (net foreign assets) for 145 countries, we create the financial openness indictor (FOP) by 
uniting the three elementary variables of financial openness: (1) foreign exchange reserve; (2) net foreign assets held 
by commercial banks; and (3) financial account plus net errors and omissions, all of which are measured as the ratio 
to money supply (see Appendix 4)
13, 14. As far as international trade is concerned, we observe that a country’s 
international trade can be approximated by such aspects as exports, imports and trade volume (exports + imports). 
Among them, trade volume is commonly used in the literature though, in our view, the rest of exports and imports 
are also equally important exhibiting a similar but different trend from that of trade volume
15
. For avoiding a biased 
proxy for international trade, we combine the three ratios of trade volume, exports and imports to GDP as the 
elementary variables of trade openness (see Appendix 5). Finally, in creating the financial structure indicator (FST), 
we follow the procedures suggested by Beck and Levine (2002). First, both stock market capitalization and stock 
market total value traded are measured as the ratios to credit provided to the private sector by commercial banks. 
Next, these two ratios are merged as the financial structure variables through the principal component approach to 
make FST (see Appendix 6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 For selecting the elementary variables of financial crisis, we reviewed the “leading indicators of crisis” or early warning system 
(EWS) literature pioneered by Kaminsky et al. (1998) and further developed by several IMF economists (e.g., Berg et al. 2005). 
11 “Many of these (emerging) economies have experienced rapid growth but have also been subject to high volatility, most 
prominently in the form of severe financial crises that befell many of them during the last decade and a half” (Kose et al., 2006). 
12 As mentioned before, this study uses quarterly data series, so that we calculate quarterly volatility. If we compute monthly 
volatility, it is too fluctuating. Likewise, if annual volatility is measured, it is less fluctuating or actually a pulse dummy. 
13 The main arguments of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) are: (1) the level of net foreign assets is a fundamental determinant of 
external sustainability; and (2) many of the benefits of international financial integration (openness) are tied to gross holdings of 
foreign assets and liabilities. 
14 Indonesia’s FOP is made from the two variables of the foreign exchange reserve and financial account plus net errors and 
omissions only, as the three elementary variables suggested above do not share enough correlations to create FOP. 
15 For the discussion of how to measure trade openness, see Yanikkaya (2003). 
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4.   METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1    Vector Error Correction Model 
 
According to the maximum likelihood approach of Johansen (1988), the formal vector error correction 
model (VECM) with a weakly exogenous variable (WEV) is expressed ― in the framework of our analysis ― as 
follows: 
 
1 1 2 2 1 1t t p t t p t p tX Y Y Y Y u               (3) 
 
where Xt = [EG, FD, FC] is a 3 x 1 vector of the endogenous/dependent variables; Yt = [EG, FD, FC, WEV ] is the 
cointegrating vector of the endogenous and weakly exogenous variables; p is the lag order included in the system; Гi 
refers to short-run coefficient matrices; and ut is a vector of unobservable error terms. The long-run relationship 
between the endogenous/dependent variables is suggested by the rank of Π matrix (r) where 0 < r < 3. The two 
matrices α and β with dimension (3 x r) are such that αβ` = Π. The matrix β contains the r cointegrating vectors and 
has the property that β`yt is stationary. α is the matrix of the error correction presentation that measures the speed of 
adjustment from temporal disequilibrium to long-run steady state. Assuming a single cointegrating vector (r = 1) in 
the analysis, we present the following system equation: 
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(4) 
 
In the above equation, EG, FD and FC are treated as the endogenous/dependent variables, and either of 
FOP, TOP and FST is interchangeably included ― as the weakly exogenous variable ― into the cointegrating 
vector. Normalizing each of EG, FD and FC and focusing on long-run causal relationships, we conduct two types of 
causality test in line with Luintel and Khan (1999). The first test is the weak exogeneity test that imposes zero 
restrictions on α, i.e., H0: αij = 0; rejection of the null hypothesis implies that there is a long-run causality formed by 
all the underlying variables in the system (Johansen and Juselius, 1992). Another test is the strong exogeneity test 
that puts a restriction on both α and β, i.e., H0: αij βij = 0; this joint test is claimed as the most efficient approach to 
testing causality (Toda and Phillips, 1993). The strong exogeneity test enables us to highlight a specific causality, 
e.g., whether financial development causes financial crisis or not. In looking for interference, three issues are 
mattered. First, the topic of the finance-growth nexus is addressed, that is, whether the causal link runs 
finance→output or output→finance or bilaterally (finance↔output). Therefore, in Equation 4, ∆EG and ∆FD are 
treated as the dependent variables, so that either EG or FD is normalized in the cointegrating vector. Second, we are 
concerned with how each of finance and output Granger causes crisis (finance→crisis and output→crisis) having 
either positive or negative impact. In this case, as ∆FC is the dependent variable, FC is normalized in the 
cointegrating vector. Third, we look at what impact each of financial openness, trade openness and financial 
structure has on finance, output and crisis (e.g., trade openness→finance). 
 
4.2  Lee and Strazicich Test 
 
Since the structural break literature was initiated by Perron (1989), it has been a standard idea that a 
structural break(s) exists in time series data. In performing the cointegration analysis, Johansen et al. (2000) and 
Pesaran and Pesaran (2009) suggest techniques to take the element of structural break ― in the form of level shift 
dummy ― into estimation. We allocate the structural break in economic growth dummy (SBGD) in the 
cointegration analysis while seeking break dates in each country’s EG series (real per capita GDP) through the test 
developed by Lee and Strazicich (2003; 2004) (hereafter the LS test). The LS test is a Lagrange multiplier unit root 
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test that endogenously determines at most two breaks in a series
16
. The rationale for employing the LS test is that, 
over the sample period around 1981Q1 to 2008Q4, it is not sure if there is only a single break in a series but the 
presence of at most two breaks is reasonably expected. More importantly, while ADF-type endogenous break tests 
(e.g., Perron, 1997; Zivot and Andrew, 1992) tend to provide incorrect break date(s) (Lee and Strazicich, 2001), the 
LS test is free from such an error in estimation, as the LS tests properly assumes the unit root null with breaks but 
ADF-type tests do not do so. For detecting break dates in the series (e), the LS test starts with the following data 
generating process: 
 
1,       t t t t t ty Z e e e                                          (5)
 
 
where Zt is a vector of exogenous variables (more precisely 0-1 binary dummies) and εt ~ iid N (0, ζ
2
). In 
conducting the LS test, we estimate four models
17
. First of all, Model A is the crash model that allows for one break 
in the intercept as described by Zt = [1, t, Dt]' where Dt is an indicator dummy variable for a mean shift occurring at 
time TB as Dt = 1 for t ≥ TB+1 and zero otherwise; TB represents the break date and δ` = (δ1, δ2, δ3). Model AA 
comprises two breaks in the intercept as given by Zt = [1, t, D1t, D2t]' where Djt = 1 for t ≥ TBj + 1, j = 1, 2, and zero 
otherwise. Model C is the trend break model that allows for a single structural break in both the intercept and slope 
as described by Zt = [1, t, Dt, DTt]' where DTt is the corresponding trend shift variable as          for t ≥ TB+1, 
and zero otherwise. Model CC allows two breaks in both the intercept and slope so that Zt = [1, t, D1t, D2t, DT1t, 
DT2t]' where           for t ≥ TBj + 1, j = 1, 2, and zero otherwise. Next we shift to the following regression in 
order to calculate break dates: 
 
1t t t t
y Z S                                                    (6)
 
 
where                ; t = 2,...,T,    is the coefficient vector in the regression of ∆yt on ∆Zt;    is given by 
      ; and y1 and Z1 are the first observations of yt and Zt, respectively. The unit root null hypothesis is described 
by ϕ = 0 and the LM test statistic is provided by:   = t-statistics testing the null hypothesis of ϕ = 0. For this analysis, 
it is important that the location of the break (TB) is determined by searching all possible break points for the 
minimum (i.e., the most negative) unit root test t-test statistic. 
 
Referring to the break dates estimated by the LS test in Table 1, we allocate a level shift dummy (i.e., 
SBGD) ― as the deterministic component outside the cointegrating vector ― in each country’s cointegration 
analysis. For example, India’s SBGD of two breaks given by Model CC (SBCC) takes the form as illustrated in Fig. 
1. The dummy variables reported in the forth column of Table 2 are chosen from the total of four allocations for 
each country and confirmed as optimal in estimating each model of different weakly exogenous variables (i.e., FOP, 
TOP and FST)
18
. Here, the selection mainly depends on whether the dummy allocation provides a single 
cointegration (r = 1) and no serial correlation in estimation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 The main argument given by Lee and Strazicich (2003; 2004) is that ADF-type endogenous break unit root tests exhibit size 
distortion and consequent spurious rejection of the null hypothesis when those tests are applied to unit root processes subject to 
break(s). Note that we stay away from this ongoing debate because the purpose of using the LS test in this analysis is to correctly 
set break dates in EG series. Hence, for confirming unit root/stationarity of each underlying variable, we conventionally rely on 
both ADF and PP tests (see Section 5.1). 
17 As suggested by Lee and Strazicich (2003; 2004), we omit models B and BB of “changing growth” that assume break(s) in a 
trend only, since most economic time series can be adequately described by four models of A, AA, C and CC. 
18 As far as the lag length is concerned, the effective lag order is selected for each model (see Section 5.1). 
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Table 1: Break Dates in EG Series 
Model India Indonesia Mexico 
 Break date(s) Break date(s) Break date(s) 
A 1997Q1 1998Q1 1994Q2 
AA 1992Q4,1997Q1 1991Q4,2001Q4 1993Q1,1996Q1 
C 1997Q1 1998Q1 1996Q1 
CC 1991Q4, 2004Q2 1995Q2,1998Q3 1994Q3, 1998Q3 
Notes: Models A and AA = the clash models (break(s) only in the intercept); Models C and CC = the trend break models 
(break(s) in both the intercept and trend). 
 
 
Fig. 1: India’s SBCC (= SBGD of Two Breaks Estimated by Model CC) 
 
 
 
Table 2: Selected Lag Order (k), Deterministic Component and Dummy Variables 
Panel A: India    
Weakly exogenous variable k D. component Dummy variable 
FOP 3 Restricted trend SBCC, PCD 
TOP 4 Restricted trend SBAA 
FST 5 Restricted trend SBCC, PCD 
Panel B: Indonesia    
Weakly exogenous variable k D. component Dummy variable 
FOP 4 Restricted trend SBAA 
TOP 5 Restricted trend SBA 
FST 4 Restricted trend SBAA 
Panel C: Mexico    
Weakly exogenous variable k D. component Dummy variable 
FOP 5 Restricted trend SFD 
TOP 4 Restricted trend SBCC 
FST 5 Restricted trend SFCD 
Notes: SBA = SBGD of one break estimated by Model A; SBAA = SBGD of two breaks estimated by Model AA; SBCC = 
SBGD of two breaks estimated by Model CC; PCD = Pre-crisis dummy (one for 1990Q1 to 1990Q4 otherwise zero; only for 
India). SBC (= SBGD of one break estimated by Model C) is not selected. 
 
 
5.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The total of 27 models was estimated for the three countries over different sample periods ― 1981Q1 to 
2008Q4 for India, 1981Q1 to 2006Q4 for Indonesia and 1987Q1 to 2008Q4 for Mexico ― due to data availability. 
Nonetheless, during these periods, high economic growth and rapid financial deepening were typically observed 
together with liberalization in both the financial and trade sectors and severe financial crises in the three countries. 
While some models exhibit the evidence of heteroscedasticity and non-normality in residuals, all the models are free 
from serial correlation at the 10% significance level or better
19
. 
 
                                                 
19 For conserving space, all the results relevant to the analysis are not presented (e.g., diagnostic and unit root tests) but are given 
on request. 
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5.1   Unit Root and Cointegration Tests 
 
As the initial step in the cointegration analysis, both the Augmented Dickey and Fuller (ADF) (Said and 
Dickey, 1984) and Phillips and Perron (PP) (Phillips and Perron, 1988) unit root tests were conducted. The test 
statistics reveal that all the underlying variables of EG, FD, FC, FOP, TOP and FST are non-stationary in their levels 
but become stationary after taking the first difference. Thus, we conclude that these variables are I(1)
20
. Next, the 
Johansen (1988) cointegration test is implemented while FOP/TOP/FST is treated as a weakly exogenous variable in 
the cointegrating vector
21
. In performing the Johansen test, the effective lag order ― rather than the optimal lag 
order given by the lag section criteria ― is adopted for each model (see the second column of Table 2). For seeking 
the “effective” lag order, we check whether a lag order gives a single cointegration (r = 1) and autocorrelation-free 
significant estimates. Moreover, as the deterministic component, each of restricted intercept, unrestricted intercept 
and restricted trend is included into the cointegrating vector, and it is confirmed that the restricted trend provides 
best significant results to all the models (see the third column of Table 2); we empirically consider the trend 
component as a proxy for miscellaneous exogenous factors in each economy. Then, the trace statistics in Table 3 
show that there is a single cointegration relationship (r = 1) among EG, FD and FC at the 5% level in all the models. 
 
 
Table 3: Johansen Cointegration Test Results (Trace Statistics) 
Panel A: India Weakly exogenous variable 
 FOP  TOP  FST  
Null Result 5% Result 5% Result  5% 
r = 0 73.253* 52.748 67.902* 54.575 55.319* 53.648 
r <= 1 32.549 33.908 28.956 33.953 27.481 33.590 
r <= 2 5.216 4.767 4.923 17.163 11.683 17.072 
Panel B: Indonesia Weakly exogenous variable 
 FOP  TOP  FST  
Null Result 5% Result 5% Result 5% 
r = 0 87.913* 54.858 63.762* 52.538 84.583* 54.169 
r <= 1 24.810 34.238 26.303 33.779 29.037 33.832 
r <= 2 7.642 17.564 5.397 16.925 4.621 17.347 
Panel C: Mexico Weakly exogenous variable 
 FOP  TOP  FST  
Null Result 5% Result 5% Result  5% 
r = 0 50.282* 49.973 54.079* 53.352 52.417* 49.637 
r <= 1 18.946 31.383 20.290 33.538 24.158 30.660 
r <= 2 4.826 15.652 7.881 16.964 9.236 15.157 
Notes: * denotes 5% level of significance. The trace statistics were simulated through 400 random walks and 2500 replications. 
 
 
5.2   Identified Cointegrating Vectors 
 
Tables 4, 5 and 6 report identified cointegrating vectors for economic growth, financial development and 
financial crisis, respectively, together with α (ECT coefficient) and weak exogeneity test statistics. From the results 
we discover that finance and output are positively correlated except a few estimates of Mexico, and the effects of the 
endogenous and weakly exogenous variables on the other variables considerably vary among the three countries and 
models. Moreover, the ECT coefficient measures the speed of adjustment back to the long-run equilibrium whenever 
there is a deviation from the steady state in the system. The ECT coefficients―statistically significant with a 
negative sign ― provided in the third column show acceptable sizes. For economic growth, the adjustment speed 
ranges 5.3% to 9.9% in India, 3.2% to 8.6% in Indonesia and 2.9% to 9.0% in Mexico (see Table 4). The adjustment 
                                                 
20 As mentioned above in footnote 16, albeit staying away from the debate given by Lee and Strazicich (2003; 2004), we 
estimated the LS unit root test for all the series and detected that, depending on models, i.e., either crash models (A and AA) or 
trend break models (C and CC), the results are different. Yet, looking at the LS test statistics as well as the ADF and PP test 
statistics, we concluded that all the underlying variables are I(1). 
21 In the Johansen (1988) cointegration analysis, weakly exogenous variables are not requested to be I(1). But, we performed the 
unit root tests for those variables that are included in the cointegrating vector but are not treated as the dependent variables. 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – December 2011 Volume 10, Number 12 
68 © 2011 The Clute Institute 
speed of financial development is confirmed as 2.2% to 20% in India and 3.2% to 6.7% in Mexico. For Indonesia, 
all the ECT coefficients demonstrate a positive sign, so that no long-run relationship is found out for financial 
development (see Table 5). As far as financial crisis is concerned, the adjustment speed is detected as 18% to 27.2% 
for India, 16.9% to 30.7% for Indonesia and 2.6% to 47.8% for Mexico (see Table 6). 
 
 
Table 4: Identified Cointegrating Vectors for Economic Growth 
Panel A: India 
Weakly exogenous Cointegrating vector α (ECT coefficient) & 
variable  weak exogeneity test 
FOP 
(7.261) ( 7.097) ( 3.542) (7.018)
0.484 0.106 0.100 0.006EG FD FC FOP Trend
 
     -0.089 [0.015]** 
TOP 
(2.537) ( 7.912) ( 0.134) (8.528)
0.233 0.080 0.010 0.009EG FD FC TOP Trend
 
     -0.099 [0.004]*** 
FST 
(1.172) ( 6.218) (0.309) (2.885)
0.192 0.174 0.011 0.005EG FD FC FST Trend

     -0.053 [0.016]** 
Panel B: Indonesia 
Weakly exogenous Cointegrating vector α (ECT coefficient) & 
variable  weak exogeneity test 
FOP 
(0.373) ( 7.174) ( 5.901) (9.896)
0.013 0.044 0.675 0.010EG FD FC FOP Trend
 
     -0.083 [0.000]*** 
TOP 
(1.498) ( 3.985) (2.679) (8.010)
0.049 0.045 0.135 0.009EG FD FC TOP Trend

     -0.086 [0.002]*** 
FST 
(0.554) ( 8.329) ( 0.163) (3.489)
0.047 0.118 0.002 0.008EG FD FC FST Trend
 
     -0.032 [0.001]*** 
Panel C: Mexico 
 
 
Weakly exogenous Cointegrating vector α (ECT coefficient) & 
variable  weak exogeneity test 
FOP 
(3.408) ( 4.260) ( 4.239) (3.117)
0.718 0.639 3.155 0.016EG FD FC FOP Trend
 
     0.001 
TOP 
( 3.212) ( 6.176) (3.159) (0.526)
0.201 0.229 0.540 0.001EG FD FC TOP Trend
 
      -0.029 [0.007]*** 
FST 
(2.828) (0.688) (0.217) (4.525)
0.103 0.009 0.012 0.004EG FD FC FST Trend      -0.090 [0.013]** 
Notes: t-statistic is given in ( ) for each loading factor (β) in the cointegrating vector. α is associated with the weak exogeneity 
test result for which p-value is reported in [ ]. *** and ** denote 1% and 5% levels of statistical significance, respectively. 
 
 
Table 5: Identified Cointegrating Vectors for Financial Development 
Panel A: India 
Weakly exogenous Cointegrating vector α (ECT coefficient) & 
variable  weak exogeneity test 
FOP 
(6.876) (6.900) (3.541) ( 4.509)
2.068 0.219 0.208 0.012FD EG FC FOP Trend

     -0.200 [0.014]** 
TOP 
(5.651) (6.718) (0.141) ( 5.890)
4.300 0.342 0.042 0.039FD EG FC TOP Trend

     -0.106 [0.005]*** 
FST 
(2.670) (5.703) ( 0.274) ( 1.565)
5.214 0.907 0.058 0.028FD EG FC FST Trend
 
     -0.022 [0.034]** 
Panel B: Indonesia 
Weakly exogenous Cointegrating vector α (ECT coefficient) & 
variable  weak exogeneity test 
FOP 
(7.527) (7.141) (5.381) ( 7.022)
77.279 3.404 52.131 0.759FD EG FC FOP Trend

     0.003 
TOP 
(6.049) (4.533) ( 2.401) ( 4.934)
20.238 0.902 2.735 0.178FD EG FC TOP Trend
 
     0.021 
FST 
(3.127) (8.458) (0.152) ( 2.652)
21.257 2.500 0.051 0.166FD EG FC FST Trend

     0.007 
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Table 5:  Continued 
Panel C: Mexico 
 
 
Weakly exogenous Cointegrating vector α (ECT coefficient) & 
variable  weak exogeneity test 
FOP 
(0.336) (3.783) (4.447) ( 1.532)
1.394 0.891 4.397 0.023FD EG FC FOP Trend

     -0.032 [0.014]** 
TOP 
( 1.355) ( 6.598) (3.325) (0.286)
4.971 1.139 2.683 0.004FD EG FC TOP Trend
 
      -0.067 [0.002]*** 
FST 
( 3.131) (0.564) (0.333) (3.253)
9.714 0.089 0.117 0.037FD EG FC FST Trend

      -0.021 [0.216] 
Notes: t-statistic is given in ( ) for each loading factor (β) in the cointegrating vector. α is associated with the weak exogeneity 
test result for which p-value is reported in [ ]. *** and ** denote 1% and 5% levels of statistical significance, respectively. 
 
 
Table 6: Identified Cointegrating Vectors for Financial Crisis 
Panel A: India 
Weakly exogenous Cointegrating vector α (ECT coefficient) & 
variable  weak exogeneity test 
FOP 
( 4.056) (4.165) ( 4.955) (4.284)
9.456 4.571 0.950 0.053FC EG FD FOP Trend
 
      -0.272 [0.006]*** 
TOP 
( 5.016) (1.912) ( 0.132) (7.700)
12.573 2.924 0.122 0.114FC EG FD TOP Trend
 
      -0.197 [0.017]** 
FST 
( 1.658) (0.667) (0.259) (1.397)
5.749 1.103 0.064 0.031FC EG FD FST Trend

      -0.180 [0.028]** 
Panel B: Indonesia 
Weakly exogenous Cointegrating vector α (ECT coefficient) & 
variable  weak exogeneity test 
FOP 
( 7.916) (0.390) ( 5.382) (6.580)
22.703 0.294 15.315 0.223FC EG FD FOP Trend
 
      -0.192 [0.001]*** 
TOP 
( 5.901) (1.662) (2.586) (4.909)
22.447 1.109 3.034 0.198FC EG FD TOP Trend

      -0.169 [0.050]** 
FST 
( 3.324) (0.597) ( 0.147) (2.465)
8.504 0.400 0.020 0.066FC EG FD FST Trend
 
      -0.307 [0.000]*** 
Panel C: Mexico 
 
 
Weakly exogenous Cointegrating vector α (ECT coefficient) & 
variable  weak exogeneity test 
FOP 
( 0.372) (3.350) ( 5.244) (1.625)
1.565 1.123 4.936 0.026FC EG FD FOP Trend
 
      -0.297 [0.000]*** 
TOP 
( 1.355) ( 3.429) (3.437) (0.286)
4.366 0.878 2.356 0.004FC EG FD TOP Trend
 
      -0.478 [0.000]*** 
FST 
(3.786) (2.804) ( 0.225) ( 3.243)
109.078 11.229 1.310 0.410FC EG FD FST Trend
 
     -0.026 [0.006]*** 
Notes: t-statistic is given in ( ) for each loading factor (β) in the cointegrating vector. α is associated with the weak exogeneity 
test result for which p-value is reported in [ ]. *** and ** denote 1% and 5% levels of statistical significance, respectively. 
 
 
5.3  Finance-Growth Nexus 
 
Table 7 documents the findings relevant to India, Indonesia and Mexico’s finance-growth nexus. “Yes” and 
“No” are based on the results of the strong exogeneity test (H0: αij βij = 0); the “Yes” result is significant at the 10% 
level or better, whereas the “No” result either is insignificant or exhibits a positive ECT coefficient (α). The weak 
exogeneity test (H0: αij = 0) results significant at the 10% level or better are denoted by § (see the third columns of 
Tables 4, 5 and 6 as well). And our conclusions of the three countries’ finance-growth nexus are summarized in 
Table 8. First of all, India’s finance-growth nexus is estimated as bilateral (finance↔output); this two-way result 
agrees with those of Demetriades and Hussein (1996), Luintel and Khan (1999) and Singh (2008). For Indonesia, the 
supply-leading hypothesis is strongly supported, as all the three models find out the causal link of finance→output 
with no feedback. Meanwhile, according to Mexico’s estimation, the three models of different weak exogenous 
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variables find out different causal directions. Specifically, finance and output are negatively correlated in Mexico 
when TOP and FST are taken as the weakly exogenous variable
22
. Thus, Mexico’s finance-growth causality is 
considered as a more complex phenomenon than those in India and Indonesia where finance and output demonstrate 
a positive effect on each of them ― in line with standard theory ― as provided by all the models. Such divergence 
across the three countries’ finance-growth nexus gives support to the country-by-country analysis in the framework 
of cointegration and Granger causality, indicating that the cross-country and panel data approach is more likely to 
hide important variation among the sample countries. 
 
 
Table 7: Finance-Growth-Nexus (1) 
Panel A: Finance→output Weakly exogenous variable   
Country FOP TOP FST 
India Yes**§ (+) Yes***§ (+) Yes**§ (+) 
Indonesia Yes***§ (+) Yes***§ (+) Yes***§ (+) 
Mexico No Yes***§ (-) Yes**§ (-) 
Panel B: Output→finance Weakly exogenous variable   
Country FOP TOP FST 
India Yes*§ (+) Yes***§ (+) Yes*§ (+) 
Indonesia No No No 
Mexico Yes**§ (+) Yes***§ (-) No 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels of statistical significance, respectively. § indicates that the weak exogeneity 
test result (α with a negative sign) is significant at the 10% level or better. (+) and (-) denote positive and negative, respectively, 
as the causal direction of financial repression is confirmed by its sign in the cointegrating vector. 
 
 
Table 8: Finance-Growth Nexus (2) 
Country Result 
India Finance↔output (+) 
Indonesia Finance→output (+) 
Mexico FOP: Output→finance (+) 
 TOP: Finance↔output (-) 
 FST: Finance→output (-) 
Notes: (+) and (-) denote positive and negative, respectively, as the causal direction of financial repression is confirmed by its 
sign in the cointegrating vector. 
 
 
5.4   Finance-Growth-Crisis Nexus 
 
Table 9 reports the effects of financial crisis ― as the independent variable ― either on output or on 
finance. It is evident that financial crisis negatively impacts output in India and Indonesia as detected by all the three 
models. In case of Mexico, however, the diverse results are found out. As far as the impact of crisis on finance is 
concerned, a positive linkage of crisis→finance is confirmed in India, no result is obtained for Indonesia, and each 
of the three models gives different estimates to Mexico. On the other hand, Table 10 illustrates how financial crisis 
― as the dependent variable ― is influenced either by output or by finance; in this case, more uniformed estimates 
are detected. Roughly looking at Table 10, we identify negative causality of output→crisis and positive causality of 
finance→crisis across the three countries except a few results of Mexico. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 Kassimatis and Spyrou (2001) examined the finance-growth nexus in Mexico and found that financial development had 
negative impact on output due to the repeated banking crises. 
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Table 9: Finance-Growth-Crisis Nexus (1) 
Panel A: Crisis→output Weakly exogenous variable   
Country FOP TOP FST 
India Yes***§ (-) Yes***§ (-) Yes***§ (-) 
Indonesia Yes***§ (-) Yes***§ (-) Yes***§ (-) 
Mexico No Yes***§ (-) Yes*§ (+) 
Panel B: Crisis→finance Weakly exogenous variable   
Country FOP TOP FST 
India Yes***§ (+) Yes***§ (+) Yes***§ (+) 
Indonesia No No No 
Mexico Yes***§ (+) Yes***§ (-) No 
Notes: *** and * denote 1% and 10% levels of statistical significance, respectively. § indicates that the weak exogeneity test 
result (α with a negative sign) is significant at the 10% level or better. (+) and (-) denote positive and negative, respectively, as 
the causal direction of financial repression is confirmed by its sign in the cointegrating vector. 
 
 
Table 10: Finance-Growth-Crisis Nexus (2) 
Panel A: Output→crisis Weakly exogenous variable   
Country FOP TOP FST 
India Yes***§ (-) Yes***§ (-) Yes**§ (-) 
Indonesia Yes***§ (-) Yes***§ (-) Yes***§ (-) 
Mexico Yes***§ (-) Yes***§ (-) Yes***§ (+) 
Panel B: Finance→crisis Weakly exogenous variable   
Country FOP TOP FST 
India Yes***§ (+) Yes**§ (+) Yes*§ (+) 
Indonesia Yes***§ (+) No § Yes***§ (+) 
Mexico Yes***§ (+) Yes***§ (-) Yes***§ (+) 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels of statistical significance, respectively. § indicates that the weak exogeneity 
test result (α with a negative sign) is significant at the 10% level or better. (+) and (-) denote positive and negative, respectively, 
as the causal direction of financial repression is confirmed by its sign in the cointegrating vector. 
 
 
From the findings in Tables 9 and 10, we first highlight a positive causality of finance→crisis that is 
discovered in all the three countries. Especially, India’s findings reveal a two-way causality of finance↔crisis. The 
positive causality of finance→crisis implies that the increasing level of financial depth significantly causes financial 
crisis. And India’s bilateral linkage of finance↔crisis means that if some macroeconomic policies ― that simply 
increase volatility in the economy ― are adopted, deeper finance is seemingly attained through financial boom; 
however, such a volatility-led financial development is obviously dangerous, as it will just overheat the economy 
irrespective of conditions in the real sector and ultimately bring about financial crisis. Meanwhile, the stronger 
evidence of a negative bidirectional causality of output↔crisis has been found out. In particular, all the three models 
of India and Indonesia’s assessments support this negative two-way causal link. This finding corroborates with the 
implication given by the macroeconomic volatility literature, that is, a negative correlation exists between 
macroeconomic volatility and economic growth (Ramey and Ramey, 1995; Kose et al., 2006; Ahmed and Suardi, 
2009)
23
. Again, the exception is Mexico. In particular, taking FST as the weakly exogenous variable into estimation, 
we have detected a positive bilateral causality of output↔crisis in Mexico. 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 The rationale is that increased uncertainties on future returns associated with macroeconomic volatility discourages investment 
behaviors and thus lowers economic growth (Pindyck, 1991). 
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5.5   Impact of FOP/TOP/FST on Output/Finance/Crisis 
 
Panels A and B of Table 11 summarize the impacts of financial openness, trade openness and financial 
structure (hereafter FOP, TOP and FST, respectively) either on output (EG) or on finance (FD) in the three 
countries. India’s findings show that both FOP and TOP have a negative impact on output and a positive impact on 
finance, whereas FST is positive to output and negative to finance. Although FOP and TOP promote finance and 
thus exhibit the growth effect via financial development, their direct impacts on output seem to be disturbing in 
India. Likewise, Indonesia’s results demonstrate that: both FOP and FST are negative to output; TOP is positive to 
output; and since the ECT coefficients display a positive sign in all the FD models, the impacts on finance are not 
presented. Furthermore, Mexico’s estimation revels that: FOP is positive to finance; TOP is positive to both output 
and finance; and FST is positive to output. Here, we argue that the positive effect of TOP on output should not be 
simply emphasized, as TOP also enhances financial development that is negative to output in Mexico (see Table 4). 
 
Subsequently, the effects of FOP, TOP and FST on financial crisis are reported in Panel C of Table 11. 
India’s findings show that both FOP and TOP are negative to FC at the 5% significance level, so that these two can 
reduce the risk of financial crisis. In contrast, India’s FST exerts a positive impact on FC; considering the positive 
linkage of FST→EG as well, we highlight that the growing extent of stock market development relative to banking 
holds a positive effect on output while exposing the economy to more danger of financial crisis. On the other hand, 
Indonesia’s estimates reveal that both FOP and FST have a negative effect on FC, and TOP is positive to FC. 
According to Mexico’s results, both FOP and FST are negative to FC, and the effect of TOP on FC is positive. Thus, 
different from India, it is TOP that is the key factor leading to financial crisis in Indonesia and Mexico. In summary, 
we pick up a view that enhancing international risk sharing, financial and trade liberalization should reduce 
macroeconomic volatility (i.e., FOP/TOP→FC(-)]and foster economic growth (i.e., FOP/TOP→EG(+)); in practice, 
however, their empirical effects are less clear-cut (Ahmed and Suardi, 2009). The results in Table 11 support this 
view and confirm that, since FOP, TOP and FST ― interacting with various country-specific conditions ― exert 
complicated impacts on each economy, their effects should be addressed through country-by-country assessment. 
 
 
Table 11: Impact of FOP/TOP/FST on Output/Finance 
Panel A: FOP/TOP/FST→EG    
Country FOP→EG TOP→EG FST→EG 
India Yes***§ (-) Yes**§ (-) Yes**§ (+) 
Indonesia Yes***§ (-) Yes***§ (+) Yes***§ (-) 
Mexico No Yes***§ (+) Yes*§ (+) 
Panel B: FOP/TOP/FST→FD    
Country FOP→FD TOP→FD FST→FD 
India Yes***§ (+) Yes**§ (+) Yes*§ (-) 
Indonesia No No No 
Mexico Yes***§ (+) Yes***§ (+) No 
Panel C: FOP/TOP/FST→FC    
Country FOP→FC TOP→FC FST→FC 
India Yes**§ (-) Yes**§ (-) Yes*§ (+) 
Indonesia Yes***§ (-) Yes**§ (+) Yes***§ (-) 
Mexico Yes***§ (-) Yes***§ (+) Yes**§ (-) 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels of statistical significance, respectively. § indicates that the weak exogeneity 
test result (α with a negative sign) is significant at the 10% level or better. (+) and (-) indicate positive and negative, respectively, 
as the causal direction of financial repression is confirmed by its sign in the cointegrating vector. 
 
 
6.   CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
This paper investigated the “finance-growth-crisis nexus” in India, Indonesia and Mexico while controlling 
for financial openness, trade openness and financial structure as the weakly exogenous variables in the Johansen 
(1988) cointegration analysis. The element of structural break was also mattered in estimation by conducting the Lee 
and Strazicich (2003; 2004) break test. The main findings are: (1) the causal direction of finance-growth nexus 
varies among the three countries; (2) the growing extent of financial depth is crucial to the incidence of financial 
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crisis; and (3) the effects of financial openness/trade openness/financial structure on output/finance/crisis are not 
straightforward to stylize. Considering the divergent results of the finance-growth-crisis nexus in India, Indonesia 
and Mexico, we conclude that a country-specific assessment ― using time series techniques ― is essential to draw 
plausible policy implications for each economy. Especially, among the three countries, standard theory is not simply 
applicable to Mexico where output and finance are negatively correlated as estimated by two of the three models. If 
the cross-country and panel data approach is employed, such an important difference can be dismissed and a single 
uniform interference is given to all the three countries. 
 
In the end, on the basis of our analysis of the finance-growth-crisis nexus, we present the following policy 
implications. First, it has been proved that while deeper financial development potentially causes financial crisis 
(finance→crisis(+)), output and crisis are negatively correlated (output↔crisis(-)). These findings imply that as an 
economy is excessively financialized, the deviation between the real and financial sectors expands together with the 
increasing risk of financial crisis. Hence, a well-designed and regulated financial development compatible with the 
real sector is vital to attain crisis-free economic growth otherwise the speculation in financial markets can be 
dominant over real conditions in the economy. Second, the view ― the more externally open an economy is, the 
better growth performance is expected ― should not be accepted without any modification for each economy. As 
revealed by our analysis, financial openness, trade openness and financial structure possess different but significant 
impacts on output, finance and crisis across the three countries. Since these three weakly exogenous variables 
actually represent government policies for liberalization and globalization, the results mean that although external 
openness (external finance and international trade) and stock market development are considered as essential to 
achieve high economic growth in developing economies, they are not absolute policy measures. 
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APPENDIXES 
 
Appendix 1: Elementary Variables of Financial Development 
Definition (Name) Sources 
Money supply / GDP (MTG) Line 35L (for money supply) and 99B (for GDP) 
Deposit money bank assets / GDP (BATG) All categories of line 22 (for deposit money bank assets) and line 99B 
Private credit by deposit money banks / GDP 
(PCTG) 
Line 32D (for private credit) and 99B 
Stock market capitalization / GDP (SKTG) FSD 
Stock market total value / GDP (SVTG) FSD 
Notes: All the “lines” refer to those of the International Financial Statistics (IFS). Annual series of SKTG and SVTG are 
disaggregated to quarterly ones by the Boot et al. (1967) method. FSD = Financial Structure Dataset. 
 
 
Appendix 2: Elementary Variables of Financial Crisis 
Definition (Name) Sources 
Exchange rate (ER) ER = NER * (USCPI / SCPI) where NER is nominal exchange rate (line RF), and USCPI and 
SCPI are US and sample country’s consumer price indexes, respectively. 
Money supply / foreign 
exchange reserve (MTF) 
MTF = NM / (FER * NER) where NM is nominal money supply (line 35L), and FER is foreign 
exchange reserve (line 1D). 
External debt (ED) § ED = (NED * NER) / CPI where NED is nominal external debt (WDI). 
Trade volume (TV) TV = [(X + I) * NER] / CPI where X + I is exports + imports (lines 70 and 71). 
Oil price (OP) OP = (NOP * NER) / CPI where NOP is nominal oil price (line 76AA). 
Gov. consumption 
expenditure (GCE) § 
GCE = NGCE / CPI where NGCE is nominal gov. consumption expenditure (line 91) 
Share price (SP) SP = NS / CPI where NSP is nominal share price (line 62). 
Inflation rate (IR) IR = [(CPI – CPI(-1)) / CPI(-1)] * 100 
Real interest rate (RR) RR = NR – IR where NR is nominal interest rate (discount rate) (line 60). 
GDP (GDP) § GDP = NGDP / CPI where NGDP is nominal GDP (line 98B). 
Money supply (MS) MS = NM / CPI 
Total domestic deposit (TD) TD = NTD / CPI where NTD is the sum of demand- and time deposits (lines 24 and 25). 
Deposit money bank assets 
(BA) 
BA = NBA / CPI where NBA is nominal bank assets (all categories of line 22). 
Private credit by deposit 
money banks (PC) 
PC = NPC / CPI where NPC is nominal private credit (line 32D). 
Stock  market capitalization 
/ GDP (SKTGV) § 
FSD 
Stock market total 
value / GDP (SVTGV) § 
FSD 
Notes: All the “lines” refer to those of the International Financial Statistics (IFS). § indicates that annual series are disaggregated 
to quarterly ones by the Boot et al. (1967) method except GDP that is by the Chow and Lin (1971) method. WDI = World 
Development Indicators. FSD = Financial Structure Dataset.  
 
 
Appendix 3: Selected Elementary Variables of Financial Crisis 
Country Elementary Variables of Financial Crisis 
India ER, MTF, ED, TV, OP, SP, IR, GDP, TD, SKTGV 
Indonesia ER, MTF, ED, TV, OP, GCE, IR, MS, TD, BA, PC 
Mexico ER, MTF, ED, TV, OP, GCE, SP, IR, BA, PC, SVTGV 
 
 
Appendix 4: Elementary Variables of Financial Openness 
Definition (Name) Sources 
Foreign exchange reserve / money supply (FRTM) Lines 1D (for foreign exchange reserve) and 35L (for money 
supply) 
Commercial banks’ net foreign assets / money supply (FATM) Lines 31N (for commercial banks’ net foreign assets) and 35L 
Financial account plus net errors & omissions / money supply 
(FETM) 
Lines 78BJD (for financial account), 78CAD (for net errors & 
omissions) and 35L 
Notes: All the “lines” refer to those of the International Financial Statistics (IFS). Indonesia’s FOP is made from the two 
variables of FRTM and FETM only, as the three elementary variables suggested do not share enough correlations to create FOP. 
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Appendix 5: Elementary Variables of Trade Openness 
Definition (Name) Sources 
Trade volume (exports + imports) / GDP (TVTG) Lines 70 (for exports), 71 (for imports) and 99B (for GDP) 
Exports / GDP (EXTG) Lines 70 and 99B 
Imports / GDP (IMTG) Lines 71 and 99B 
Notes: All the “lines” refer to those of the International Financial Statistics (IFS). 
 
 
Appendix 6: Elementary Variables of Financial Structure 
Definition (Name) Sources 
S. market capitalization§ / private credit (SKTP) FSD (for stock market capitalization) and line 32D (for private 
credit) 
S. market total value§ / private credit (SVTP) FSD (for stock market total value) and line 32D 
Notes: All the “lines” refer to those of the International Financial Statistics (IFS). § indicates that annual series are disaggregated 
to quarterly ones by the Boot et al. (1967) method. 
 
 
Appendix 7: India’s EG and Summary Indicators (1981Q1 to 2008Q4) 
   (a) EG                                                                                        (b) FD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   (c) FC                                                                                         (d) FOP, TOP and FST 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.5 
3.9 
4.3 
4.7 
1
9
8
1
Q
1
  
1
9
8
4
Q
3
  
1
9
8
8
Q
1
  
1
9
9
1
Q
3
  
1
9
9
5
Q
1
  
1
9
9
8
Q
3
  
2
0
0
2
Q
1
  
2
0
0
5
Q
3
  1 
1.5 
2 
2.5 
1
9
8
1
Q
1
  
1
9
8
4
Q
3
  
1
9
8
8
Q
1
  
1
9
9
1
Q
3
  
1
9
9
5
Q
1
  
1
9
9
8
Q
3
  
2
0
0
2
Q
1
  
2
0
0
5
Q
3
  
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
1
9
8
1
Q
1
  
1
9
8
4
Q
3
  
1
9
8
8
Q
1
  
1
9
9
1
Q
3
  
1
9
9
5
Q
1
  
1
9
9
8
Q
3
  
2
0
0
2
Q
1
  
2
0
0
5
Q
3
  
-5 
-3 
-1 
1 
1
9
8
1
Q
1
 
1
9
8
4
Q
3
 
1
9
8
8
Q
1
 
1
9
9
1
Q
3
 
1
9
9
5
Q
1
 
1
9
9
8
Q
3
 
2
0
0
2
Q
1
 
2
0
0
5
Q
3
 
FOP TOP FST 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – December 2011 Volume 10, Number 12 
78 © 2011 The Clute Institute 
0 
0.5 
1 
1.5 
2 
1
9
8
1
Q
1
  
1
9
8
4
Q
3
  
1
9
8
8
Q
1
  
1
9
9
1
Q
3
  
1
9
9
5
Q
1
  
1
9
9
8
Q
3
  
2
0
0
2
Q
1
  
2
0
0
5
Q
3
  
Appendix 8: Indonesia’s EG and Summary Indicators (1981Q1 to 2006Q4) 
   (a) EG                                                                                        (b) FD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  (c) FC                                                                                         (d) FOP, TOP and FST 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 9: Mexico’s EG and Summary Indicators (1987Q1 to 2008Q4) 
   (a) EG                                                                                        (b) FD 
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